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Synthetic Biology promises low-cost, exponentially scalable products and global health
solutions in the form of self-replicating organisms, or “living devices.” As these promises
are realized, proof-of-concept systems will gradually migrate from tightly regulated
laboratory or industrial environments into private spaces as, for instance, probiotic health
products, food, and even do-it-yourself bioengineered systems. What additional steps,
if any, should be taken before releasing engineered self-replicating organisms into a
broader user space? In this review, we explain how studies of genetically modified
organisms lay groundwork for the future landscape of biosafety. Early in the design
process, biological engineers are anticipating potential hazards and developing innovative
tools to mitigate risk. Here, we survey lessons learned, ongoing efforts to engineer
intrinsic biocontainment, and how different stakeholders in synthetic biology can act to
accomplish best practices for biosafety.
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BEYOND THE LAB—WHERE SYNTHETIC ORGANISMS MAY
APPEAR IN THE FUTURE
Synthetic biologists aim to create living systems that serve imme-
diate human needs, rather than waiting for evolution to produce
a useful biological function. Reverse-engineered organisms are
currently being used in closed industrial settings to produce
fuels (e.g., Chromatin Inc., Ginkgo Bioworks, LS9 Inc., Solazyme,
Verdezyne, and Synthetic Genomics), generate renewable chemi-
cals of commercial value (e.g., Genencor, Genomatica Sustainable
Chemicals, and Verdezyne), and reduce the cost of pharma-
ceutical production (e.g., Ambrx and Amyris). In these cases,
preventing accidental release is straightforward. Closed industrial
settings use synthetic organisms where physical containment and
proper waste management can bemonitored and enforced by reg-
ulatory bodies (e.g., Environmental Health and Safety groups and
the Environmental Protection Agency in the U.S.). Since acciden-
tal release is still a possibility, containment mechanisms that are
built into the synthetic organism could be used to enhance safe
use. In contrast to closed settings, open systems (e.g., bioremedia-
tion, agriculture, and healthcare applications) distribute synthetic
organisms across broader spaces in an unpredictable manner, and
thus require intrinsic containment mechanisms.
Recent reports of clinical applications and anticipated uses
of synthetic organisms show that the appearance of synthetic
organisms in broader spaces is on the horizon. Groups in Europe
have tested engineered microbes to treat human illnesses such
as Crohn’s disease (Braat et al., 2006) and oral inflammation
(mucositis) (Caluwaerts et al., 2010). Some anticipate the use
of engineered organisms in future space travel, taking engi-
neered organisms beyond our planet (“The Initiative | Synthetic
Biology,” last accessed October 21, 2012, http://syntheticbiology.
arc.nasa.gov/node/1). Recent bio-fiction video projects paint
intriguing pictures of engineered synthetic organisms operating
in personalized contexts as consumer goods (“E. chromi,” last
accessed October 22, 2012, http://vimeo.com/19759432; “Tuur
van Balen—Hacking Yoghurt,” last accessed October 22, 2012,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Co8NOnErrPU), as living,
evolving therapeutics (“Cellularity,” last accessed October 22,
2012, http://vimeo.com/10274649), and even as recreational
drugs (“Compound 74,” last accessed October 22, 2012,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lQjF8ir4SKs). These pieces
are styled to provoke the viewer with conceptual yet plausi-
ble scenarios, and to make us question where the technology
may lead. Recent and speculative synthetic biology applications
have catalyzed discussions of releasing synthetic organisms into
the public sphere. The synthetic biology research community
should respond by making visible efforts to address safe use and
containment.
AWARENESS, CONCERNS, AND PUBLIC SAFETY
CHALLENGES
Synthetic biology is unique because of its ethos—to use design
principles from nature for the rational design and construction
of molecular systems with novel, reliable functions (Heinemann
and Panke, 2006). Synthetic biology uses the same molecular
biology practices as genetic engineering. Therefore, the tech-
niques employed by synthetic biology do not pose any unique
safety threats. Technologies that made genetic engineering a real-
ity in the early 1970’s spurred the organization of the Asilomar
Conference on Recombinant DNA (rDNA) to discuss biosafety.
Over the subsequent decades, concerns have waned. Now that
synthetic biology has gained substantial attention and popularity,
concerns about rDNA have re-emerged.
Synthetic biology has been admonished as an extreme form
of genetic engineering by watch groups (“111 Organizations
Call for Synthetic Biology Moratorium,” last accessed October
22, 2012, http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2012/03/
111-organizations-call-for-synth.html). Catchphrases such as
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“extreme genetic engineering” or “playing God,” which cast syn-
thetic biology as a threat to human well-being, diminish the fact
that the core ethos of synthetic biology, engineering (Heinemann
and Panke, 2006), is a design process that aims to make human
inventions reliable, predictable, and safe. Policies based on the
precautionary principle could stunt the development of synthetic
biology. Ironically, synthetic organisms might turn out to be the
best solution for global health challenges and ecological problems
such as accessible healthcare and carbon emission.
One recent study concluded that the fears that synthetic
biologists are tampering with nature or “playing God” are not
sufficient to establish a strong argument to restrict synthetic biol-
ogy research for the sake of human well-being (Link, 2012).
Along the same vein, if harnessing electricity had been restricted
before the industrial revolution, mankind may never have experi-
enced the benefits of modern electronic technologies. Still, overly
optimistic promises of the benefits of synthetic biology are as
unsound as than fearful perceptions. If synthetic organisms and
their derivatives are to become as ubiquitous as electronic devices,
then synthetic biologists must openly address the responsible and
safe use of synthetic biological systems.
We can assuage fear and foster familiarity with synthetic biol-
ogy through effective efforts to inform the public of the actual
risks of synthetic biology research, the steps we can take to address
the risks, and how this technology can be harnessed to meet
society’s needs. Since the 1970’s, attempts have been made to
address public concerns regarding the safety of genetically mod-
ified microbes (Schmidt and de Lorenzo, 2012). In 2009, the US
Department of Health and Human Services released a finalized
list of guidelines for identifying hazardous synthetic agents based
on DNA sequence homology (“Screening Framework Guidance
for Providers of Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA,” November
19, 2010, available at http://www.phe.gov/preparedness/legal/
guidance/syndna/Pages/default.aspx). However, scientists have
expressed doubt about the usefulness of an approach that focuses
only on DNA sequences (Eisenstein, 2010). The biosafety infor-
mation is enveloped in very technical language that is not acces-
sible to non-specialists. There is little evidence that these efforts
have swayed public perceptions (“Awareness and Impressions of
Synthetic Biology,” September 9, 2010, available at http://www.
synbioproject.org/library/publications/archive/6456/). A request
for a synthetic biology moratorium released by 111 organizations
including ETC Group and Friends of the Earth is an example
of how the public may react when coordinated efforts toward
executing containment and control strategies are not highly visi-
ble (“111 Organizations Call for Synthetic Biology Moratorium,”
last accessed October 22, 2012, http://news.sciencemag.org/
scienceinsider/2012/03/111-organizations-call-for-synth.html).
The Woodrow Wilson Synthetic Biology Project has recently
developed a public web portal to present developments and
biosafety activities in the field to non-specialists (“Synthetic
Biology Project,” last accessed October 21, 2012, http://www.
synbioproject.org/). In addition, the Woodrow Wilson group
has proposed a framework for risk research that addresses four
public safety issues (Dana et al., 2012). First, how might syn-
thetic organisms interact with natural ones? Second, how well
will they survive in receiving environments? Third, how might
they evolve and adapt to fill new ecological niches? Lastly, what
is the potential for gene transfer into unmodified organisms?
The synthetic biology community can address these questions
through designing, building, and testing synthetic systems.
GENETIC SAFEGUARDS: BUILDING CONTAINMENT
MECHANISMS INTO SYNTHETIC LIFE
Decades of work in closed settings, such as research labs, might
suggest that engineered organisms pose little threat. So far, no
bio-hazardous incidents have been traced back to engineered
organisms (Schmidt and de Lorenzo, 2012). Furthermore plas-
mids, the small circular pieces of DNA that encode engineered
functions, persist poorly in host cells over time. Reduced viabil-
ity in plasmid-carrying microbes compared to non-engineered
parent strains has been observed (Betenbaugh et al., 1989).
Nonetheless, if speculations correctly predict the future use of
synthetic biology, the technology will scale to large industrial vol-
umes, introduce large numbers of synthetic organisms into the
environment for bioremediation, and be used in private spaces
where dispersal and disposal are difficult to monitor. Innovative
containment mechanisms will improve safety in open synthetic
systems. Genetic safeguards operate within the synthetic organ-
isms themselves to prevent escaped microbes from proliferat-
ing unchecked and to prevent the spread of engineered genetic
material into unintended host cells.
CONTAINMENT THROUGH ENGINEERED AUXOTROPHY
One method for biocontainment is to engineer auxotrophic
organisms that are unable to synthesize an essential compound
required for their survival. Once auxotrophic microbes escape the
controlled environment where the compound is supplied, they
rapidly die (Figures 1A,B). The first active genetic containment
system, reported in 1987, used engineered auxotrophy (Molin
et al., 1987). Prior to this innovation, genetically compromised
bacteria were used for industrial applications. These weakened
microbes may be safe to use, but this approach reduces industrial
productivity and increases product cost. Molin and colleagues
designed a DNA cassette that could function as a conditional sui-
cide system in any healthy bacterial strain (Molin et al., 1987).
In the absence of an artificially supplied growth supplement,
the cassette produced Hok, a toxic protein that damages bac-
terial cell membranes (Gerdes et al., 1986) and kills the cells.
Another version of this system used stochastic activation of Hok
to kill a predetermined fraction of cells per unit of time (Molin
et al., 1987). Stochastic activation could help to tune the level of
lethality so that an optimal level of bioproduction is achieved.
A pioneering containment system for bioremediation appli-
cations was published in 1991 by Contreras et al. (1991). They
designed a genetic switch to kill microbes once a mission was
completed (e.g., after degrading an environmental pollutant).
Cells engineered to destroy the pollutant compound benzoate
remained alive in the presence of that compound. Benzoate deple-
tion activated an artificial xylS gene switch, which produced Gef,
a toxic protein that functions in a similar manner as Hok (Poulsen
et al., 1989). Later, Jensen et al. showed that two copies of the xylS-
gef switch improved killing of benzoate-depleted cells (Jensen
et al., 1993). Further improvements were pursued by testing other
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FIGURE 1 | Genetic safeguard strategies. Recombinant DNA (bright green)
is introduced into the host chromosome (white wavy lines). Two pathways for
engineered auxotrophy (A,B) kill synthetic organisms (blue) once they lose
access to a supplement (+) in a controlled environment. The supplement either
(A) suppresses a toxic gene product (−) or (B) provides nutrition to compensate
for a genetic deletion (red X). The induced lethality system (C) produces a toxic
gene product (−) in response to an inducer (i) such as IPTG, sucrose,
arabinose, or heat. Gene-flow prevention (D) is accomplished by placing a
toxic gene into the recombinant DNA (dark blue/bright green circle) in an
immune host. Transfer of the recombinant plasmid kills unintended host cells.
toxic proteins, including streptavidin (Szafranski et al., 1997). A
different gene switch has been designed for trophic containment
of engineered yeast. In the absence of high glucose concentra-
tions, the yeast express either toxic RelF or Serratia NucA DNase
(Kristoffersen et al., 2000; Balan and Schenberg, 2005).
Deletions of essential genes have been used to improve the
efficacy of genetic containment. Ronchel and colleagues placed
a dual system in cells where the aspartate-β-semialdehyde dehy-
drogenase gene (asd) was deleted (Ronchel and Ramos, 2001).
The asd deletion renders Pseudomonas putida dependent upon
diaminopimelic acid, methionine, lysine, and threonine supple-
ments. An engineered xylS-controlled asd gene was introduced
into cells along with the xylS-gef system, so that benzoate deple-
tion caused both production of Gef and deactivation of the
growth-promoting gene asd. Recently, interleukin 10-secreting
auxotrophic Lactococcus lactis (Steidler et al., 2003) has been used
to treat Crohn’s Disease (Braat et al., 2006). In order to prevent
uncontrolled proliferation, auxotrophy was created by eliminat-
ing thymidylate synthase (thyA) (Steidler et al., 2003). The pop-
ulation of engineered bacteria fell below detection limits in the
absence of thymidine and did not acquire functional thymidylate
synthase from other bacteria in controlled experiments in pigs.
A thorough review of biosafety practices for genetically modi-
fied L. lactis has been recently published (Bahey-El-Din, 2012).
Engineered auxotrophy is also highly effective in eukaryotes, such
as the aquatic plant Lemna. In Lemna engineered to produce ther-
apeutic proteins and vaccines, isoleucine auxotrophy was created
by using RNA interference (RNAi) to silence threonine deaminase
(Nguyen et al., 2012). Engineered auxotrophy via gene knock-out
or silencing can remain effective as long as gene transfer does
not compensate for the mutations and as long as the nutrient
that is required for survival is not available outside of the target
environment.
ACTIVE CONTAINMENT THROUGH INDUCED LETHALITY
Induced lethality (Figure 1C), or “kill switch” mechanisms have
been engineered as genetic safeguards. The engineered organisms
survive normally until an inducer signal (e.g., IPTG) is added.
Induced lethality could be used clean up synthetic microbe spills
without harming other cells in the environment. An early proof of
concept switch was created by placing the toxic hok gene under the
control of the strong and inducible lac promoter (Bej et al., 1988).
Later, other toxic proteins that are homologous to Hok (Poulsen
et al., 1989), such as RelF (Knudsen and Karlström, 1991) and
Gef (Bej et al., 1992), were tested in lac-controlled kill switches. In
microcosm studies, Knudsen and colleagues demonstrated effec-
tive IPTG-induced kill switch activation of engineered microbes
in soil, seawater, and an animal model (rat intestine) (Knudsen
et al., 1995). Other inducers such as heat (Ahrenholtz et al., 1994),
sucrose (Recorbet et al., 1993), and arabinose (Li and Wu, 2009)
have been used to activate death in engineered cells.
Recent developments in artificial cell division counters have
brought us closer to timed, automatic death of synthetic cells.
A set of synthetic genetic components that includes a riboreg-
ulated transcriptional cascade and a recombinase-based cascade
of memory units can count up to three events (Friedland et al.,
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2009). These counting circuits could be designed to limit the life
span of synthetic cells by linking the circuit to intracellular cell
cycle-cues. Genes such as hok, relF, or gef could be added so that
a toxic protein is produced after a certain number of cell cycles
(Lu et al., 2009).
GENE-FLOW BARRIERS
In the absence of prohibitive mechanisms, plasmids are frequently
transferred between microbes through conjugation (Heuer and
Smalla, 2007). Furthermore, the death of an engineered organism
is not necessarily accompanied by the disappearance of its rDNA.
Cell-free DNA can remain functional and transferable even after
exposure to harsh conditions (Lyon et al., 2010). Thus, scientists
have developed systems to prevent the uptake and inheritance of
engineered genetic material.
Gene-flow barriers are created by including a killer gene in the
rDNA and placing the rDNA into an immune host. Immunity
from the killer gene is provided by a repressor protein that blocks
killer gene expression. If unintended hosts take up the engineered
DNA, the lethal gene is decoupled from immunity and the new
host cell dies (Figure 1D). RNA cleaving by colicin E3 reduces
survival of recipient cells (Díaz et al., 1994; Munthali et al., 1996).
Other systems include an additional safety measure that uses
nucleases, such as EcoRI, to destroy DNA in recipient cells (Torres
et al., 2000). Torres and colleagues created a reinforced barrier by
combining colicin E3 and the EcoRI DNA endonuclease in a single
system (Torres, 2003).
Stable integration of the rDNA may be a simpler way to effec-
tively prevent gene-flow. For instance, integration of rDNA into
an engineered microbe’s chromosomes reduces transmissibility
of the synthetic genetic material (Ronchel et al., 1995; Munthali
et al., 1996; Panke et al., 1998; Martínez-García et al., 2011). In
plants, rDNA can be inserted into chloroplast DNA instead of
chromosomal DNA. Thus, the rDNA remains in stationary plant
tissues more often than transmissible pollen granules (Svab and
Maliga, 2007).
OBSERVED FAILURES OF ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS
Unfortunately, not all genetic safeguards are completely fail-
proof. Occasionally, an engineeredmicrobe’s DNAmay undergo a
spontaneous mutation that destroys the genetic switch (Knudsen
and Karlström, 1991) or bestows immunity against the lethal gene
(Bej et al., 1988), enabling the engineered cells to propagate out-
side of their contained environment. Are laboratory-measured
failure rates high enough to warrant serious concern? How do
failure rates scale with population size? We surveyed laboratory
studies of genetic safeguard systems and calculated the expected
number of survivors per 2 liters, the volume of the familiar soft
drink container (Figure 2). A proliferating culture of Escherichia
coli that contains about 100 million (1× 108) cells per milliliter
of culture medium [BioNumbers record ID 10985 (Milo et al.,
2009)] would consist of 100 billion cells in a 2-liter volume.
Table 1 shows the projected number of microbes that would sur-
vive after the activation of a genetic safeguard. These numbers are
based on escape rates reported for various systems tested under
laboratory conditions and in environmental microcosm models
(i.e., soil, water, rat intestine). The recommended limit of engi-
neered microbe survival or engineered DNA transmission is less
than 1 cell per 108 cells (Wilson, 1993), or less than 1000 cells per
2 liters, according to the National Institutes of Health. So far, only
a few of the genetic safeguards meet this limit. Synthetic biolo-
gists should consider the difficulty in meeting this standard when
designing genetically-contained synthetic organisms.
IMPROVING GENETIC SAFEGUARDS
SOLUTIONS FOR KILL SWITCH FAILURE
Toxic gene cassettes are attractive because they enable scientists
to potentially add a biocontainment mechanism to any synthetic
FIGURE 2 | Reported frequencies of engineered bacteria that escape
various genetic safeguard systems. A 2-liter volume is represented here as
a standard soft drink container (left). Lowest reported frequencies (shown on
the y-axis, log scale) were multiplied by the estimated number of cells in
2-liters at 1× 108 cells/mL, where OD600 = 0.1 [BioNumbers record ID
10985 (Milo et al., 2009)]. The dashed line indicates the maximum survival
limit (1000 cells per 2 liters) recommended by the National Institutes of
Health (Wilson, 1993).
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Table 1 | Lowest reported frequencies of microbes that escape engineered auxotrophy and induced lethality safeguard systems.
Safeguard type References Microbe Mechanism Reported survival rate
Engineered auxotrophy Molin et al., 1987 B. subtilis, E. coli, P. putida Tryptophan hok switch or
stochastic hok expression
1.00E-4
Contreras et al., 1991 E. coli xylS-gef switch 1.00E-6
Jensen et al., 1993 E. coli, P. putida xylS-gef switch (2 copies) 1.00E-8
Ronchel et al., 1995 P. putida xylS-gef switch
(chromosome insert)
5.70E-7
Szafranski et al., 1997 P. putida xylS-streptavidin switch 1.00xE-8
Kristoffersen et al., 2000 S. cerevisiae GAL1-relE switch Not reported
Ronchel and Ramos, 2001 P. putida (in soil) xylS-gef switch, gene
deletion (asd )
1.00E-9
Steidler et al., 2003 L. lactis Gene deletion (thyA) Below detection limits
Balan and Schenberg, 2005 S. cerevisiae (in soil) ADH2-nucA switch 1.00E-6
Braat et al., 2006 L. lactis (in human patients) Gene deletion (thyA) Below detection limits
Induced lethality Bej et al., 1988 E. coli (in soil) IPTG-inducible hok Not reported
Knudsen and Karlström, 1991 E. coli IPTG-inducible relF, 2 copies 5.00E-9
Bej et al., 1992 P. putida IPTG-inducible gef 1.00E-5
Recorbet et al., 1993 E. coli Sucrose-inducible sacB 1.00E-5
Ahrenholtz et al., 1994 E. coli Heat-inducible nucA 2.00E-5
Knudsen et al., 1995 E. coli (in soil, seawater, rats) IPTG-inducible relF, 2 copies 1.00E-7
Li and Wu, 2009 E. coli Arabinose-inducible nucA Not reported
organism. Thus, lethal genes are the most widely used feature
of genetic safeguards. Unfortunately, the lethal gene is a central
cause of safeguard failure. Under certain conditions, both deac-
tivation and activation of lethal gene expression may exacerbate
the failure of biocontainment. As engineered cells are passaged in
the laboratory, or as they propagate in large bioreactors, broken
genetic safeguards can gradually accumulate in the population. If
the utility of the biocontainment mechanism is lost, then the syn-
thetic organisms might survive in the environment after disposal
or accidental release.
Lethal gene expression can be deactivated by spontaneous
genetic mutations that arise from DNA replication error (i.e.,
when newly replicated DNA is not identical to its template) and
DNA rearrangements (i.e., transposon mobilizations or chro-
mosome breakage and repair) as a population of synthetic cells
increases through many rounds of cell division. As a result,
the population becomes non-responsive to the genetic safe-
guard. Knudsen and Karlström applied a classic Nobel Prize-
winning approach (Luria and Delbrück, 1943) to measure the
rate of spontaneous mutation of a relF kill switch (Knudsen
and Karlström, 1991). In several trials, cells were grown for
roughly 14 divisions and treated with IPTG to activate the
toxic relF gene. Up to 49 cells survived in each experiment.
Poisson distribution of survival showed that spontaneous muta-
tions deactivated relF at various time points during population
growth. In a population of synthetic organisms, cells carry-
ing a mutated kill switch might gain a growth advantage and
overwhelm the population (Figure 3). Experiments have demon-
strated that slowing down growth by maintaining cells in a
suboptimal medium and at a lowered incubation tempera-
ture prevented the accumulation of mutations that damage the
lethal gene (Knudsen and Karlström, 1991). Presumably, these
FIGURE 3 | An illustration of the accumulation of damaged genetic
safeguards in a population of synthetic organisms. When cells with
intact safeguards (blue) escape physical containment (e.g., an accidental
spill), an inducer (i) can be added to remove them from the environment
(see Figure 1C). As the population grows, leaky expression of the lethal
protein (−) reduces the viability of cells that carry functional safeguards.
Mutation (X) of the lethal gene provides a growth advantage, thus cells that
carry damaged safeguards (red) overwhelm the population. Cells with
mutated safeguards do not respond to the cell death inducer (i).
Consequently, it is difficult to remove the cells from the environment after
an accidental release.
measures reduce the number of mutations by preventing rapid
cell division.
The obvious approach for designing an effective kill switch
is by expressing high levels of a lethal gene, (e.g., placing relF
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under the control of a strong promoter). What may be less obvi-
ous is that strong promoters have higher basal expression levels,
which can lead to genetic safeguard failure in a microbial popu-
lation. When the kill switch is in the off-state, leaky expression
of the toxic gene product will lead to decreased survival of cells
that have functional lethal genes. Therefore, tight repression of
the lethal gene’s promoter can substantially increase the survival
of cells that carry a functional genetic safeguard (Knudsen and
Karlström, 1991).
MINIMAL GENOMES AND ORTHOGONAL LIFE
Scientists are developing creative new strategies that might
address the shortcomings of genetic safeguards, such as the ones
described in Figures 2, 3, and Tables 1, 2. Minimal genomes
(Box 1) that contain only the genes that are necessary to sus-
tain life could make many random DNA mutations lethal. Thus
the likelihood of unexpected evolution and unpredictable behav-
ior after the microbe is released into the environment would be
reduced (DeWall and Cheng, 2011). Minimal synthetic chromo-
somes may 1 day be routinely produced by emerging technologies
such as whole genome synthesis (Gibson et al., 2010) and large-
scale genome editing (MAGE/CAGE; Box 1) (Isaacs et al., 2011).
Orthogonal (Box 1) life forms that use artificial genetic lan-
guages are a proposed genetic firewall that prevents the transfer
of synthetic traits to natural biological systems (Schmidt and de
Lorenzo, 2012). The orthogonal life form approach uses biochem-
ical building blocks (i.e., nucleic acids and amino acids) that are
incompatible with natural cells (for reviews see Liu and Schultz,
2010; Schmidt, 2010). Developments in the field of xeno (Box 1)
nucleic acids (XNA) have yielded foreign genetic alphabets (Hirao
et al., 2012), DNA double helix geometries, and nucleic acid back-
bones. Artificial bases including Ds, Px (Yamashige et al., 2012),
dSICS, dMMO2 (Leconte et al., 2008; Lavergne et al., 2011), and
dP, dZ (Sismour, 2004; Yang et al., 2006) preferentially bond as
unnatural pairs instead of with the natural A, T, C, and G bases.
Alternative DNA geometries such as expanded DNA (xDNA) and
wide DNA (yDNA) (Krueger et al., 2007) are too large to fit
into natural helices. Alternative nucleic acid backbones includ-
ing threose (TNA), hexose (HNA), and glycol nucleic acid (GNA)
(Pinheiro and Holliger, 2012) replace the natural poly-P-ribose
and poly-P-deoxyribose backbones with molecular chains that
cannot be replicated by natural polymerases. Recently, practi-
cal applications of orthogonal nucleic acids have been reported.
XNA has been replicated in cell-free systems (e.g., PCR) (Yang
et al., 2011; Betz et al., 2012; Malyshev et al., 2012), XNA has
Box 1 | Glossary of terms.
Minimal Genome—a chromosome that contains only the genes
that are necessary to sustain life. Pseudogenes and other non-
essential DNA are removed from the chromosome.
MAGE—Multiplex Automated Genome Engineering.
CAGE—Conjugative Assembly Genome Engineering.
Orthogonality—(greek: orthos—“straight,” and gonia—angle)
Modification of one component of a system that does not propa-
gate side effects to other components of the system.
Xeno—greek: xeno—“foreign.”
been used to express functional green fluorescent protein (GFP)
(Krueger et al., 2011), and living bacteria have been evolved to use
chlorouracil as a substitute for thymine (Marlière et al., 2011).
Orthogonal systems have also been engineered at the protein
production level. Orthogonal amino acids have been incorpo-
rated into proteins in E. coli and yeast by matching an artificial
transfer RNA (tRNA)/aminoacyl tRNA synthetase pair with an
otherwise unused messenger RNA (mRNA) codon (the amber
nonsense codon, TAG) (Wang et al., 2001; Chin, 2003) or a com-
pletely novel quadruplet codon AGGA (Anderson et al., 2004).
The repertoire of functional quadruplet codons was expanded by
artificially evolving a new E. coli ribosome (Neumann et al., 2010).
Synthetic mRNA codons, tRNAs, and ribosomes make up a com-
pletely orthogonal protein translation system that may be used
to create useful synthetic organisms that do not interfere with
natural systems.
We are still a long way from robust orthogonal systems that
can be used for practical applications. System-specific replica-
tion machinery needs to be developed to truly insulate XNA
from DNA-based life forms. Current working orthogonal sys-
tems are natural-xeno hybrids. In the long term, fully orthogonal
organisms could lead to a new method of engineered auxotrophy.
Synthetic microbial survival would decline without a constant
supply of orthogonal building blocks (XNA and xeno amino
acids) from a controlled environment.
However, whether orthogonal systems can be completely insu-
lated from the natural world is a question that is open for debate.
Nucleic acids with alternative backbones (TNA, HNA, and GNA)
can bond with natural DNA and RNA (Pinheiro and Holliger,
2012). This bonding could act as a toxin by interfering with DNA
replication and proper gene expression. Scientists must still con-
sider how escaped orthogonal organisms might impact natural
environments.
RISK ANALYSIS IN SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
REPORTING RISK-RELATED DATA
Synthetic biology is at an opportune stage of development where
current scientists can make risk-related analysis and data report-
ing a standard practice. Currently, we have methods to predict
and test the environmental impact of an engineered microbe on
indigenous microbial populations in soil (Corich et al., 2007;
reviewed in Urgun-Demirtas et al., 2006). However, this work is
limited to a few representative cases. The field needs an accepted,
standard analytical method for determining the safety of a newly
designed synthetic organism. We should avoid the temptation to
allow representative studies and anecdotal evidence to define risk
universally for every newly engineered organism.
There are many questions that must be addressed before deter-
mining appropriate risk and safety analyses. Should we expect
all types of synthetic organisms to be subjected to the same
risk analysis? What should standard methods for determining
the safety of newly designed synthetic organism be? Until we
can answer these questions, it would be prudent to include risk-
related data in the original scientific report for every synthetic
organism. A community-wide effort to report risk-related data
would produce a wealth of information that could be parsed for
meta-analyses and follow-up studies. We propose a method for
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reporting risk-related data (Box 2), based the Woodrow Wilson
group’s four focus areas for determining the safety of synthetic
organisms: survival of synthetic organisms in receiving environ-
ments, gene transfer, interactions between synthetic and natu-
ral organisms, and adaptation of synthetic organisms to new
ecological niches (Dana et al., 2012).
We can try to predict environmental risk by considering
known characteristics of the parent organism species or strain,
such as the most likely ecological niches of the organism (e.g.,
soil, water, within a host cell). Risk that is related to synthetic
modifications should also be reported. Scientists can measure
synthetic versus wild type organism growth rates to determine
any artificially enhanced growth (Londo et al., 2011). It is essential
to determine the behavior of the synthetic organism in rele-
vant microcosms (Bej et al., 1988; Knudsen et al., 1995; Ronchel
et al., 1995; Ronchel and Ramos, 2001; Steidler et al., 2003;
Balan and Schenberg, 2005), especially for engineered cells that
are intended for environmental release or human and animal
exposure. Reports would also include any characteristics that
might aid biological containment (e.g., compromised fitness, kill
switches, etc.).
The risk of gene transfer depends upon the ability of the host
microbe to undergo conjugation, the viral motility of the engi-
neered DNA, and the likelihood of plant pollination (van Elsas
and Bailey, 2002; Brigulla and Wackernagel, 2010; Londo et al.,
2011). The release of high-copy plasmids from dead cells might
also result in gene transfer. Scientists should report rDNA transfer
rates if they have collected such data (see Table 2 for examples).
In some cases, we can assume interactions between synthetic
and natural organisms when the former has certain synthetic
modifications. Alterations that enable synthetic cells to adhere
with natural cells, invade cell membranes (Agapakis et al., 2011),
or kill other cells (Russell et al., 2011) should be explicitly
reported. When the synthetic organism is not explicitly designed
for cellular interaction, its impact on natural cells is more difficult
to predict. In this case, experiments should be done to measure
the synthetic system’s synergistic or toxic effect on cells it will
most likely come into contact with.
The potential of synthetic organisms to adapt to new ecological
niches can be reported by highlighting engineered functions that
could impart adaptive behavior. For instance, synthetic systems
that are engineered to survive in multiple environments could
pose a containment risk. Amicrobe that is engineered to consume
pollutants (Contreras et al., 1991) has the potential to thrive on a
greater variety of nutrients than its wild-type precursor. Scientists
might develop ways to make synthetic organisms more robust,
perhaps by making cells less sensitive to normally toxic condi-
tions, or by making cells invisible to the human immune system.
Box 2 | A hypothetical journal article section that reports risk and biosafety information for a seminal engineered genetic toggle
switch (Gardner et al., 2000).
RISK ANALYSIS AND BIOSAFETY DATA
Environmental risk:
• Parent organism species/strain—E. coli JM2.300.
• Most likely ecological niche(s)—None. JM2.300 is a derivative of E. coli K-12, a debilitated strain that does not normally colonize
the human intestine and survives poorly in the environment (“Escherichia coli K-12 Derivatives Final Risk Assessment,” last accessed
October 22, 2012, http://epa.gov/oppt/biotech/pubs/fra/fra004.htm).
• Growth rate compared to unmodified parent strain—Not determined.
• Containment—A thi-mutation renders JM2.300 dependent upon thiamine for growth.
Gene transfer potential—The toggle switch is carried on a low copy number plasmid (pBR322 ColE1 replication origin, 15–20 copies
per cell). JM2.300 is an F-strain (Brenner et al., 2007). It is capable of receiving F plasmids through conjugation, and is not capable of
transmitting plasmids to other microbes.
Potential interactions—Not determined.
Adaptive behavior—None identified.
Table 2 | Efficacy of gene-flow barriers.
References Donor Recipient Gene-flow barrier rDNA transfer
Díaz et al., 1994 E. coli, P. putida P. putida Colicin E3 RNase 1.60E-8
Ronchel et al., 1995 P. putida P. putida (in soil, water) Tn5 chromosome insert Below detection limits
Munthali et al., 1996 P. putida P. putida Colicin E3 RNase, Tn5
chromosome insert
1.00E-4
Torres et al., 2000 E. coli A. tumefaciens, E. coli,
P. putida, R. eutropha
EcoRI DNase 1.00E-4
Ronchel and Ramos, 2001 P. putida P. putida Tn5 chromosome insert 1.00E-8
Torres, 2003 E. coli E. coli Colicin E3 RNase, EcoRI
DNase
1.00E-8
Lowest reported frequencies of recombinant DNA (rDNA) transfer in controlled laboratory tests are shown.
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These functions could also enhance adaptation. By predicting
possible adaptations for environmental survival in advance, sci-
entists can engineer the organisms with safety mechanisms for
adequate containment.
USING SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY TO DETECT ENGINEERED ORGANISMS IN
THE ENVIRONMENT
An environmental incident is an unsettling possibility that may
someday call into question the safety of a synthetic organism.
In this case, effective forensic tools would be critical for dis-
tinguishing synthetic from natural organisms and determining
what role, if any, the synthetic organism played in the incident.
Tracking techniques based on ELISA and PCR have successfully
identified genetic modification markers along the agricultural
pipeline, from farming (Watrud et al., 2004; Dyer et al., 2009)
and harvest, through the processing (Auer, 2003). Further track-
ing potential is evident in a wide range of engineered markers,
including detectable DNA sequences, enzymatic activity, cell sur-
face markers could be added to synthetic organisms to aid the
tracking process (Urgun-Demirtas et al., 2006). A team of col-
lege art students proposed a citizen science driven system that
combined balloon cartography with PCR testing of soil sam-
ples to track the appearance of BioBrick rDNA across rural areas
in India (“Searching for the Ubiquitous Genetically Engineered
Machines,” last accessed October 22, 2012, http://2011.igem.org/
Team:ArtScienceBangalore). This creative vision suggests how
adopting genetic tagging as a standard practice today might
enable surveillance methods in the future.
INTEGRATING RISK ASSESSMENT INTO THE COMPUTER-AIDED
DESIGN PROCESS
Software designers in the synthetic biology community are devel-
oping safeguards to help scientists prevent unintentional creation
of dangerous organisms. These tools are intended to help scien-
tists design safe synthetic systems before the system is actually
built. CLOTHO is a design software tool that helps synthetic
biologists construct and simulate engineered genetic devices
(“Clotho,” last accessed October 22, 2012, http://www.clothocad.
org/). A homology search (BLAST) against virulence factors
(Chen et al., 2012) assigns risk score to modules, then alerts the
user of significant overlap with potentially dangerous sequences.
GenoGUARD is another open-source software tool that warns
against the use of potential bioterrorism-enabling DNA agents
(Adam et al., 2011; “GenoGUARD,” last accessed October 22,
2012, http://genoguard.sourceforge.net/). It uses the “bestmatch”
screening protocol method recommended by the guidelines of
the US Department of Health and Human Services (“Screening
FrameworkGuidance for Providers of Synthetic Double-Stranded
DNA,” November 19, 2010, available at http://www.phe.gov/
preparedness/legal/guidance/syndna/Pages/default.aspx).
How effective are these safeguards? The simple-catch approach
utilized by CLOTHO is based on nucleic acid sequence homology,
which is insufficient to detect multiple genetic codes that produce
the same harmful protein, and does not consider emergent prop-
erties that might cause harm at the system level. Furthermore,
there is no standard to rate the type and degree of potential harm.
These problems can be solved with additional software features.
For instance, existing protein homology algorithms could be
incorporated into programs such as CLOTHO. Exploratory col-
laborations between computer scientists and biologists might
yield new ways to predict harmfulness in higher-level proper-
ties. A more well-defined ontology for “risk” will help developers
to create an extremely critical and powerful biosafety tool. This
tool will prevent unintended harm at the design stage, before the
synthetic organism is ever created.
STAKEHOLDERS’ ROLES IN SAFE SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
In discussing best practices for biosafety, it is critical to consider
the stakeholders and their roles in the growth of the synthetic
biology industry. Key stakeholders include scientists, industry
leaders, regulatory agencies, and the public. Exciting opportuni-
ties lie ahead, in which these various stakeholders can cooperate to
shape synthetic biology. If successful, synthetic biology will stand
apart from other technologies in that it is conducted in an open
and ethical way. The synthetic biology industry is in its nascent
stages, an ideal time to establish biosafety norms.
Many companies have sprung directly from innovations in
research labs, thus scientists from those labs are also indus-
try leaders. These industry leaders should communicate with
government officials to help shape policy with effective, research-
based, achievable biosafety aims instead of allowing policy to
be formed from worst-case hypotheticals. However, the com-
panies cannot objectively do their own risk assessment and
Congress does not have the expertise. A recent report showed
that a majority of Americans were wary of voluntary guide-
lines developed jointly by industry and government (“Awareness
and Impressions of Synthetic Biology,” September 9, 2010,
available at http://www.synbioproject.org/library/publications/
archive/6456/). Thus, additional voices should also participate in
the discourse around safe synthetic biology technologies. To this
end, synthetic biologists, environmental microbiologists, pub-
lic officials, law firm representatives, and public interest group
members have recently met to discuss the best ways to address
uncertainty when assessing the environmental impacts of syn-
thetic biology (“Beyond Containment—Assessing, Testing and
Demonstrating Safety on Release of Synbio Devices and Chassis,”
last accessed October 22, 2012, http://www.synbioproject.org/
events/archive/6635/). Similar activities in Europe, such as those
organized by the SYNBIOSAFE consortium (“Synbiosafe,” last
accessed October 21, 2012, http://www.synbiosafe.eu/), show that
the shift toward inclusive discussion is far-reaching.
Regulatory agencies can be leveraged to monitor per-
sonal and environmental use of synthetic organisms. The US
Department of Health and Human Services has released a
set of guidelines to help DNA synthesis companies to only
distribute safe, non-pathogenic, non-virulent nucleic acids
(“Screening Framework Guidance for Providers of Synthetic
Double-Stranded DNA,” November 19, 2010, available at
http://www.phe.gov/preparedness/legal/guidance/syndna/Pages/
default.aspx). However, more information is needed on whether
novel synthetic systems might present different risks than current
familiar technology. There is a gap between useful technical
data in synthetic biology research reports and risk analysis. Our
proposed risk-related data report (Box 2) might help to fill this
gap by providing additional synthetic organism aspects, other
than DNA sequences, to inform risk.
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The public’s power to shape biotechnology practices and
industry is largely limited to antagonistic situations, such as class
action lawsuits after a clinical treatment has done widespread
harm. For the growing field of synthetic biology, we should ensure
that the public has a chance to broaden its influence by engag-
ing in cooperative and open dialog to help maximize the benefits
of the technology as scientists seek new ways to serve society’s
needs.
There are many open questions regarding the safety of syn-
thetic organisms and the repercussions of unintended harm.
How will we know when an accidental release is cleaned? What
will the responsible party (e.g., a for-profit company) owe to
a community affected by a spill? Which governmental agency
will be responsible for monitoring the company? What guide-
lines will the company be evaluated on? Diverse stakeholdersmust
develop a strong culture of cooperative discourse to ensure that
the technology moves forward while providing minimal harm
and maximum benefit to society.
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